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In this paper, we argue that corporate social responsibility (CSR) to various stakeholders (customers, share-
holders, employees, suppliers, and community) has a positive effect on global brand equity (BE). In addition,
policies aimed at satisfying community interests help reinforce the credibility of social responsibility policies
withotherstakeholders.Wetestthesetheoreticalcontentionsbyusingpaneldatacomprisedof57globalbrands
originatingfrom10countries(USA,Japan,SouthKorea,France,UK,Italy,Germany,Finland,Switzerland,andThe
Netherlands) for the period from 2002 to 2008. Our ﬁndings show that CSR toward each of the stakeholder
groupshasapositiveimpactonglobalBE.Inaddition,globalbrandsthatfollowlocalsocialresponsibilitypolicies
in communities obtain strong positive beneﬁts through the generation of BE, enhancing the positive
effects of CSR toward other stakeholders, particularly customers. Therefore, for managers of global brands,
when generating brand value, it is particularly effective to combine global strategies with the need to satisfy
the interests of local communities.
1. Introduction
Global brands exist in multiple markets, including the ﬁnancial
services, telecom, and fast-moving consumer goods markets. Many
ﬁrms, such as Unilever, have clearly started to focus more on building
strong global brands than on building multiple (strong) local brands
(Kumar, 2005). A strong corporate social responsibility (CSR) record
is expected from these global brands (Holt, Quelch, & Taylor, 2004).
The implementation of a CSR policy may generate a trusting relation-
ship between the company and stakeholders that causes stakeholders
to become committed to the organization through actions such as
customer loyalty, stockholder capital investments, and supplier in-
vestments (Garbarino & Johnson, 1999; Maignan & Ferrell, 2004;
Sen, Bhattacharya, & Korschun, 2006). In the global marketplace, a
ﬁrm's social and environmental track record and its treatment of em-
ployees are considered to be very important trust issues (Edelman,
2008).
However, it is frequently stated that global brands do not have
strong CSR records, and they are accused of predatory behavior
(Connor, 2001). Building up CSR reputations is difﬁcult for global
brands, as global brands have to build local CSR reputations through
local relationships while also demonstrating global social
responsibility (Polonsky & Jevons, 2009). Moreover, the CSR practices
of global brands are typically perceived as being self-interested,
which may reduce their effects on brand equity (BE) (e.g., Prout,
2006; Yoon, Gürhan-Canli, & Schwarz, 2006). Speciﬁc examples
have shown the relevance of CSR for global brands. BP's considerable
problems with their local oil operations in the Gulf of Mexico near
Louisiana had strong global repercussions for the global BP brand
(Ritson, 2010). Coca-Cola was faced with customer protests in the
UK and the USA because of what was considered to be a poor environ-
mental record in India and allegations of human rights violations in
Columbia (Hills & Welford, 2005). Moreover, the global presence of
brands and their operations may even cause the CSR policies of
strong, highly visible global brands to backﬁre. For example, Nike
has sought to associate itself with the rights, needs, and aspirations
of the socially disadvantaged, such as African Americans, women
and the disabled through brand endorsements by athletes such as
Michael Jordan (Knight & Greenberg, 2002, p. 547). However, the
anti-sweatshop movement believes that Nike is hypocritical, as Nike
has been accused of exploiting young female migrant workers in the
developing world to produce its products and only using its promo-
tional CSR toward boost sales (Knight & Greenberg, 2002). Similar ar-
guments appear in the study by Wagner, Lutz, and Weitz (2009), who
point out the negative reactions of consumers toward reactive CSR
strategies that try to mitigate harm after an irresponsible action has
been reported. The Nike case also points to a complicating issue,
namely that CSR involves activities that focus on multiple
Intern. J. of Research in Marketing 29 (2012) 13–24
⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +34 935422901.
E-mail addresses: anna.torres@upf.edu (A. Torres), t.h.a.bijmolt@rug.nl
(T.H.A. Bijmolt), joatribo@emp.uc3m.es (J.A. Tribó), p.c.verhoef@rug.nl (P. Verhoef).
0167-8116/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijresmar.2011.10.002
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Intern. J. of Research in Marketing
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijresmar
1stakeholders, including customers, employees, shareholders, and
community in which the credibility of CSR policies will play a pivotal
role in the efﬁcient implementation of CSR initiatives. Firms, there-
fore, need to understand whether and how their multi-faceted CSR
efforts have an impact on their global BE.
Within the academic literature, there is a vast amount of research
on the effects of CSR on brand performance metrics such as brand
evaluations, brand loyalty and ﬁrm performance (e.g., Du,
Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2007a; Klein & Dawar, 2004; Luo &
Bhattacharya, 2006; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003). However,
studies on CSR and global brands are scarce. Holt et al. (2004) empha-
size the importance of CSR as a means of differentiation for global
brands, while Polonsky and Jevons (2009) discuss global branding
and CSR in a qualitative manner. In-depth case studies have described
CSR issues for global brands such as Nike and Coca-Cola (e.g., Hills &
Welford, 2005; Knight & Greenberg, 2002). Research in business
ethics has also discussed the relevance of CSR toward global ﬁrms
and has considered research on CSR from a global perspective (e.g.,
Arthaud-Day, 2005; Manakkalathil & Rudolf, 1995; Prout, 2006).
However, we could not identify any studies that explicitly studied
the relationship between a global brand's CSR efforts and global BE
in an international setting.
The key research question in this study concerns the investigation
into the effects of CSR practices with different stakeholders on global
BE, with an emphasis on the role played by credible CSR initiatives.
We ﬁrst investigate whether CSR efforts impact global BE. Second,
we aim to assess which CSR efforts have the strongest effects on global
BE. We hypothesize that CSR aimed at community and customers will
have stronger effects on global BE, than CSR directed at other stake-
holders. Third, we investigate the potential moderating role of CSR to-
ward community, which confers credibility to CSR initiatives, on the
impact of CSR toward different stakeholders on BE.
We address these issues using panel data from 57 global brands
originating in 10 countries (the US, Japan, South Korea, France, the
UK, Italy, Germany, Finland, Switzerland, and The Netherlands), as in-
cluded in the 2002–2008 Sustainalytics Global Proﬁle (SGP) database.
Each ﬁrm's CSR proﬁle contains items that address major stakeholder
issues. We complement the database with global BE information
obtained from Interbrand. Our econometric approach allows us to as-
sess potential long-term effects through the inclusion of a lagged BE
term in our model. Hence, we also discuss potential long-term effects
of CSR on global BE.
The contributions of this study are threefold. First, although prior
theoretical arguments justify the connection between CSR and BE,
we provide the ﬁrst empirical study addressing this issue at an inter-
national level. Second, this study explicitly examines the differential
effects of CSR efforts with different stakeholders on global BE, in
which we speciﬁcally focus on the important role of CSR efforts to
community and customers. Last, we contemplate the interaction ef-
fects between community satisfaction and different CSR dimensions
in the generation of brand value.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We will ﬁrst
discuss our theoretical underpinnings and the derived Hypotheses.
Then, we will describe our data and the econometric model used.
The modeling results are discussed subsequently and we end with a
conclusion, a consideration of managerial implications, and a discus-
sion of our research limitations and resulting future research
directions.
2. Theoretical underpinnings and hypotheses
2.1. CSR and brand equity
CSR has gained attention in multiple disciplines including market-
ing, management, strategy, and business ethics. A relatively broad
deﬁnition of corporate social responsibility is “the company's status
and activities with respect to its perceived societal obligations”
(Brown & Dacin, 1997, p. 68). Its broad nature implies that CSR also
involves multiple initiatives relevant to multiple stakeholders, e.g.,
community support, employee support, and diversity (Sen et al.,
2006).
For brand management, ﬁrms need a strong understanding of
what is driving BE. Keller and Lehmann (2006) consider three distinct
perspectives for studying BE: a (1) customer-based, (2) company-
based and (3) ﬁnancially-based perspective. In this study, we use
the Interbrand measure for our measurement of global BE. This mea-
sure, which is discussed in greater detail in our Methodology section,
is frequently used in marketing (e.g., Madden, Fehle, & Fournier,
2006). The Interbrand measure has a rather broad perspective as it in-
volves both a ﬁnancial and a customer perspective, although it is not
free from criticism (Madden et al., 2006).
2.2. Effect of CSR on brand equity
Although there are multiple studies that examine CSR outcomes,
no study has yet investigated the effect of CSR on global BE. We ex-
pect CSR to positively affect global BE. Given that our BE measure in-
volves both a customer dimension and a ﬁnancial dimension, we use
two lines of reasoning to determine why this effect may occur. First,
CSR may affect customer brand preferences and customer loyalty
(e.g., Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004; Du et al., 2007a; Orlitzky et al.,
2003). Second, CSR may affect the ﬁnancial performance of a brand
(Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006).
Within the popular marketing literature, it is generally acknowl-
edged that CSR should positively affect customers' brand perceptions
(e.g., Rust, Zeithaml, & Lemon, 2000). Importantly, Holt et al. (2004)
argue that social responsibility is an important driver of global
brand evaluations. However, the driving role of CSR with customers
for BE depends on the credibility of such policies. Multinational compa-
niesthatmarketglobalbrandsareoftenaccusedofseekingtomaximize
their corporate proﬁts without much regard for the needs of the poorer
andweakersocietiesinwhichtheyoperate, e.g., Nike's sweatshoplabor
and Coca-Cola's alleged water exploitation (Hills & Welford, 2005;
Knight & Greenberg, 2002). Such problems may appear in visible CSR
initiatives that are connected to beneﬁt salience (Yoon et al., 2006), in
which ﬁrms are believed to use CSR only for their own self-interest
(Prout, 2006). Hence, in this situation, it is important to achieve credi-
bility in CSR initiatives to ensure effectiveness in the implementation
of CSR policies that are connected to ﬁrms' core businesses (Yoon et
al., 2006).
Within the marketing literature, there is ample evidence that cus-
tomer beliefs concerning CSR affect individual customer outcomes
such as brand preference, brand loyalty and positive word-of-
mouth. Evidence is also provided by Hoefﬂer and Keller (2002) and
Keller (2003), who report that corporate social marketing can en-
hance customer brand metrics such as brand awareness, brand
image, brand credibility and brand engagement. Lichtenstein,
Drumwright, and Braig (2004) showed that customers of a grocery
chain that has stronger CSR beliefs tend to be more loyal to that
chain. In the same vein, Du et al. (2007a) report that visible CSR
leads to stronger brand identiﬁcation, brand loyalty and brand advo-
cacy. Recently, Vlachos, Tsamakos, Vrechopoulos, and Avramidis
(2009) showed associations between CSR and repeat patronage inten-
tions and recommendation intentions. This type of customer loyalty
connected to CSR acts as an implicit brand insurance, which is particu-
larly valuable for global brands that are subject to changing social ex-
pectations, afﬂuence, and globalization (Werther & Chandler, 2005).
These authors state that “CSR is about incorporating common sense poli-
cies into corporate strategy, culture, and day-to-day decision making to
meet stakeholders' needs, broadly deﬁned. It is about creating strategies
that will make ﬁrmsand theirbrandsmoresuccessfulintheirturbulenten-
vironments. Stripped of the emotionalism and name calling, we see
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2strategicCSRasglobalbrand insurance”. Remarkably, given the risks that
controversies in one subsidiary of a global brand may affect the full or-
ganization, it is particularly relevant for such global brands to be per-
ceived as credible organizations in terms of CSR policies. Being labeled
as socially responsible organizations will prevent local problems from
negatively affecting the entire organization, which may seriously damage
a global brand image. Hence, all of these studies support the positive
main effects of CSR on multiple customer brand metrics, particularly
for global brands.
Our second line of reasoning concerns the link between CSR and a
brand's ﬁnancial performance. Orlitzky et al. (2003) theorize on two
potential ways in which CSR may affect ﬁnancial performance. The
ﬁrst is through the improvement of capabilities and competencies
within the ﬁrm. Building on the resource-based view of the ﬁrm
(Barney, 1991), they argue that CSR requires and thus improves man-
agerial competencies such as improved scanning skills, processes and
information systems, which increase the organization's preparedness
for external changes, turbulence, and crisis. Such competencies are
particularly relevant for managing global brands, as these operate in
different environments. The second way concerns the improvement
of a ﬁrm's reputation among its stakeholders. Speciﬁcally, CSR,
when credible, may build a positive image among customers (as dis-
cussed above), investors, bankers, and suppliers (Fombrun & Shanley,
1990; Sen et al., 2006). In such a setting, customer loyalty increases,
thus enhancing ﬁrm value. In addition, credible CSR initiatives reduce
information asymmetries and monitoring needs, which are particu-
larly acute in large and complex organizations, which are the organi-
zations that typically support global brands (Zajac & Westphal, 1994).
The reduction in such information asymmetries will favor non-
customer stakeholders making costly ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment by
providing valuable resources that will in turn generate BE. In their
meta-analysis, Orlitzky et al. (2003) show a positive correlation be-
tween CSR and ﬁnancial performance.
In short, the above discussion demonstrates that there is ample
evidence that CSR, particularly when visible and credible, can affect
customer brand metrics and ﬁnancial brand performance metrics.
Hence, we formally hypothesize the following:
H1. CSR positively affects global brand equity.
2.3. Differential effects of CSR initiatives to different stakeholders
In our discussion of the primary effect of CSR on BE, we consider
CSR as one broad, overarching construct. However, as already noted,
CSR involves multiple initiatives to different stakeholders (Sen et al.,
2006). In this study, we speciﬁcally distinguish CSR initiatives to com-
munity, customers, shareholders (labeled as corporate governance),
employees, and suppliers. These ﬁve stakeholders are frequently
mentioned as being important in different studies on CSR (e.g.,
Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Sen et al., 2006).
Thus far, no studies have explicitly studied the differential effects of
CSR initiatives on these different stakeholders. However, the meta-
analytic results of Orlitzky et al. (2003) suggest differential effects
between CSR initiatives. They speciﬁcally report that philanthropic
donations aimed at community were more strongly related to ﬁnan-
cial performance than all other CSR initiatives studied.
Wood and Jones (1995) argue that differential effects of CSR initia-
tives on performance may occur because the expectations and evalua-
tions of CSR may differ from one stakeholder group to another. They
furtherarguethatthereshould benomismatch betweentheCSR stake-
holder measures used and the studied outcome measure. Hence, they
suggest the existence of a positive relationship between CSR initiatives
tomarket-orientedstakeholders(i.e.,customers)andmarketmeasures.
Applying this reasoning to our study, one could argue that CSR initia-
tives relevant to customers should have a stronger effect than other
CSR initiatives on our global BE measure, which is partially based on
customer metrics. In line with this, Bhattacharya and Sen (2004, p.
14) argue that companies need to identify what customers consider to
be CSR-related activities and devote the necessary resources such
activities.
An additional explanation for the differential effects is based on
visibility reasoning. CSR initiatives may differ in their visibility
(Burke & Logsdon, 1996). While initiatives to customers may be rather
visible in the marketplace, initiatives to internal stakeholders (i.e., em-
ployees)andexternalstakeholdershigherupthesupplychain(i.e.,sup-
pliers, investors) will be less visible to consumers. Moreover, such
differentials in visibility are ampliﬁed in global brands, given that they
are closely monitored by the mass media (Clinard & Yeager, 2006).
Prior research has acknowledged the importance of CSR awareness.
Duetal.(2007a,p.238)explicitlystate “CSRawareness,orthelackthere-
of, is a key stumbling deﬁciency in most CSR strategies” (see also
Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004; Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2010; Maignan &
Ferrell, 2004; Maignan & Ralston, 2002). However, the visibility of CSR
initiatives may be less beneﬁcial to the brand when CSR initiatives are
related to the company's business (e.g., a cigarette producer sponsoring
a cancer fund), increasing the salience of ﬁrm-serving beneﬁts (Yoon et
al., 2006). To eliminate these backﬁre effects, the combination of visible
CSRinitiativesdirectedatcustomersandcredibleCSRnotdirectlyrelat-
edtoaﬁrm'scorebusinessisofparticularvalue.Oneexampleofthelat-
ter type of CSR initiative is CSR toward community. In this line, after
studying the results of a CSR initiative focusing on community of Crest
toothpaste, Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen (2007b) show that this initiative
builds credibility and customer loyalty that, in turn, enhance brand
value.
A last line of reasoning is based on Granovetter's (1983) analysis,
which suggests that distant connections among units in a large orga-
nization (those of global brands) are more informative than strong
connections in explaining a ﬁrm's behavior. A ﬁrm's actual ethical
commitment can be inferred from its behavior in regard to its loosely
connected stakeholders in terms of direct interests, e.g., local commu-
nities. Such (secondary) stakeholders are distant from the interests of
global brands' headquarters, which may function as a more credible
signal of lack of self-interest.
1 The consequence is that CSR in commu-
nities should have a signiﬁcant effect on the generation of BE through
customers' decisions, particularly when combined with visible CSR to
customers, given that customers are increasingly conscious of buying
products from ﬁrms that follow a credible CSR policy (Christmann,
2004).
Based on the above visibility and credibility rationales, we expect
that CSR initiatives to customers and community should have a stron-
ger effect on BE than initiatives to suppliers, investors, and em-
ployees. However, we emphasize that we do not expect null effects
from these latter initiatives. As discussed in our previous section,
CSR initiatives to any stakeholder group create a ﬁrm's competitive
advantage through stakeholder provision of valuable intangible re-
sources that, in turn, create ﬁrm value (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Sharma
& Vredenburg, 1998). In addition, improved reputations among em-
ployees, investors, and suppliers may beneﬁt the ﬁrm (e.g.,
Kaufman, Jayachandran, & Rose, 2006; Langerak, 2001; Orlitzky et
al., 2003; Srivastava, Shervani, & Fahey, 1998). We thus hypothesize
as follows:
H2. CSR initiatives to community, customers, investors, employees,
and suppliers each have a positive effect on global brand equity.
1 Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen (2009) differentiate between two types of stakehold-
er: primary, who are essential to the operation of the business, and secondary, who can
inﬂuence the ﬁrm's primary stakeholders. In particular, customers, employees, sup-
pliers, and shareholders constitute primary stakeholders, and broader groups, such as
community, constitute secondary stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995; Greenley, Hooley, &
Rudd, 2005; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997).
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3H3. CSR initiatives to community and customers have a stronger
effect on global brand equity than CSR initiatives to investors, em-
ployees, and suppliers.
2.4. Moderating role of CSR toward community
Previous research has emphasized the importance of implement-
ing a credible CSR practice to ensure that CSR attracts the attention
of different stakeholders (Lewellyn, 2002; Logsdon & Wood, 2002;
Mahon, 2002). CSR practices geared toward community undoubtedly
satisfy the ﬁrm's credibility (Du et al., 2007b; Vlachos et al., 2009), as
these initiatives clearly go beyond the direct interest of the ﬁrm. In
addition, as mentioned, a ﬁrm's real commitment in maintaining a
CSR policy to different stakeholders can be most clearly inferred
from a ﬁrm's relationship to distant units (Granovetter, 1983), over
which the direct interest of a ﬁrm is less clear, as is particularly appli-
cable in the case of global brands. We can identify secondary stake-
holders such as local communities as “distant” stakeholders in
regard to the interests of headquarters in global brand multinationals,
whereas CSR policies to customers could be considered as having a di-
rect relevance for the ﬁrm by creating more satisﬁed customers, for
example. Remarkably, the credibility of CSR toward community is
not only important for visible CSR initiatives such as those directed
at customers but also for “internal” stakeholders such as employees
and suppliers. These stakeholders will be more willing to make spe-
ciﬁc investments to provide valuable intangible assets when a ﬁrm
has built a reputation of credibility in social issues. In these ﬁrms,
the hold-up problem related to ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments is less
acute. The above reasoning applies particularly to global brands, as
the organizations that support them are large and more likely to suf-
fer information asymmetries that require intensive monitoring (Zajac
& Westphal, 1994). These asymmetries are the basis of agency prob-
lems preventing the aforementioned ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments.
Thus, the effectiveness of CSR initiatives to other stakeholders will in-
crease when ﬁrms, particularly global brands, have implemented CSR
practices to community. Other stakeholders will then develop a sense
of fairness, which generates credibility for CSR initiatives (Geyskens,
Steenkamp, & Kumar, 1998; Sen et al., 2006; Vlachos et al., 2009), im-
proving their effectiveness. CSR in community intended to generate
trust in other stakeholders ﬁts global brands particularly well. For
these ﬁrms, a strategy of integrating perceived brand globalness
with the development of local symbols through relationships with
local communities leads to a more proﬁtable strategy than a pure
global standardization strategy (Alden, Steenkamp, & Batra, 2006).
Based on the above reasoning, we propose that CSR initiatives to
community will reinforce the positive effects (positive moderation)
of CSR toward other stakeholders. Note that such a credibility argu-
ment in relation to communities is particularly important for global
brands, given the risks they bear from controversies in a subsidiary
of their network affecting the overall organization. As extensively dis-
cussed by Knight and Greenberg (2002), Nike's negative social perfor-
mance toward employees in developing countries might damage its
overall reputation; hence, it is particularly important for such global
brands to establish credible community-oriented CSR. We thus hy-
pothesize the following:
H4. Firms' CSR initiatives to community positively moderate the ef-
fects of CSR toward other stakeholders (customers, shareholders,
suppliers, and employees) on global BE.
3. Data set
Our sample combines panel data from two databases. The ﬁrst is
the SGP database (formerly SiRi Pro), which is the largest publicly
available international database specializing in the analysis of socially
responsible investments in Europe and North America. The SGP
database provides information on 199 items that address major
stakeholder issues, e.g., community involvement, customer policies,
employment relations, corporate governance, supplier relations,
ethical issues, and controversial activities. The data come from inter-
views by Sustainalytics specialists.
2 The second database is Inter-
brand, which provides information on the global BE of the most
valuable companies (see http://www.interbrand.com). Combining
both databases leaves us with an unbalanced panel data of 57 global
brands from 10 different countries for the period 2002–2008. The ini-
tial unbalanced panel of 357 observations
3 is reduced to 243 because
we lose 2 years (114 observations), as we lag the dependent variable
by one period to study long-term effects. The second year is lost in the
instrumentation of the endogenous variables, given that we take
instrumental variables that are constructed using speciﬁcations that
include up to 2 lagged variables (see the Methodology section). In
the ﬁnal sample, there is an average of 4 observations per ﬁrm. Such
a ﬁgure ensures that the panel is relatively balanced.
The distribution of the 57 ﬁrms and 243 observations among
countries is as follows: the United States (35 ﬁrms and 145 [59.67%]
observations), Germany (6 ﬁrms and 26 [10.70%] observations),
Japan (6 ﬁrms and 26 [10.70%] observations), France (3 ﬁrms and
13 [5.35%] observations), the United Kingdom (2 ﬁrms and 8 [3.29%]
observations), Switzerland (1 ﬁrm and 5 [2.06%] observations), Fin-
land (1 ﬁrm and 5 [2.06%] observations), Korea (1 ﬁrm and 5
[2.06%] observations), Italy (1 ﬁrm and 5 [2.06%] observations), and
The Netherlands (1 ﬁrm and 5 [2.06%] observations). In terms of dis-
tribution among the sectors (one-digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁca-
tion [SIC]), the frequencies are as follows: mining and construction
(SIC=1): (1 ﬁrm and 4 [1.65%] observations); manufacturing of to-
bacco, beverages, printing, and chemicals (SIC=2): (16 ﬁrms and
68 [27.98%] observations); manufacturing of metal, machinery, elec-
tronics, and optics (SIC=3): (26 ﬁrms and 111 [45.68%] observa-
tions); public services, e.g., transportation, radio, television, electric,
gas, and sanitary (SIC=4): (4 ﬁrms and 17 [7.00%] observations);
wholesale and retail trade (SIC=5): (4 ﬁrms and 17 [7.00%] observa-
tions); services (SIC=7): (5 ﬁrms and 22 [9.05%] observations); and
public administration (SIC=8): (1 ﬁrm and 4 [1.65%] observations).
3.1. Variables
We measure the dependent variable, Brand Equity (BE), with the
Interbrand score. Interbrand's method for valuing global brands consists
of three analyses: ﬁnancial, role of brand, and brand strength analyses.
The ﬁnancial analysis forecasts current and future revenues attributed
to the branded products, less the costs of doing business (e.g., operating
costs, taxes) and intangibles (e.g., patents, management strength), to as-
sess the portion of earnings due to the brand. The role of the brand con-
stitutes a measure of how the brand inﬂuences customer demand at the
point of purchase. Finally, brand strength provides a benchmark of the
brand's ability to secure ongoing customer demand (loyalty, repurchase,
and retention) and sustain future earnings, which translates branded
earnings into net present value. This assessment provides a structured
way to determine speciﬁc risks to the global brands' strength.
4
Keller and Lehmann (2003, 2006) divide existingmeasures of BE into
three categories: customer mind-set, product market, and ﬁnancial
2 For further information on the SGP database, see http://www.sustainalytics.com/.
3 The complete panel would have included 399 observations. The number of observa-
tions was reduced to 357 because for 14 ﬁrms, values are missing for different years in
some of the variables needed to estimate our speciﬁcations, mainly the variable on R&D.
4 From 2007 on, the weights of the seven components on which the BE measure re-
lies are rebalanced: leadership, stability, support, protection, market, trend, and inter-
nationality. To account for this discontinuity in the methodology, we include a dummy
variable in the estimations that equals 1 for the years beyond or equal to 2007 and 0 for
the years before 2007. In addition, we estimate a speciﬁcation (1) to separate the sam-
ple into two subperiods (2002–2006 and 2007–2008). The results remain consistent.
Further details on the methodology to compute the BE are available at http://www.
interbrand.com.
16 A. Torres et al. / Intern. J. of Research in Marketing 29 (2012) 13–24
4market outcomes. The measure for this study integrates product market
and ﬁnancial market outcomes, which makes the measure more “com-
plete” than a single-category measure (see Ailawadi, Lehmann, &
Neslin, 2003). In addition, the Interbrand measure addresses criticisms
concerning the lack of objectivity in BE measures based exclusively on
the customer mind-set (Ailawadi et al., 2003). Madden et al. (2006) de-
fend the use of Interbrand data. Moreover, the Interbrand measure is
widely used and inﬂuential (Farris, Bendle, Pfeifer, & Reibstein, 2006;
Haigh & Perrier, 1997). However, this measure is not free from criticism.
First, it only considers a small selection of strong (global) brands and
does not include weak brands (Chu & Keh, 2006; Madden et al., 2006).
Second, the Interbrandmeasure is proprietary (Farriset al., 2006), unlike
the frequently used Y&R Brand Asset Value measure, which is based on
surveys of consumers regarding their attitudes concerning brands (e.g.,
Mizik & Jacobson, 2008).
The independent variables include CSR practices geared toward a
range of stakeholders: community, customers, employees, suppliers,
and shareholders. As proxies for community, customers, corporate
governance, employees, and suppliers, we compute the weighted av-
erage of those items, as shown in Table 1.
5 The weights are sector-
speciﬁc and are determined by SGP analysts. They take into
Table 1
Deﬁnition of the variables.
Dependent variables
Brand equity The score that Interbrand provides for such issues is measured in millions of US $. Interbrand's method of valuing brands consists of three analyses: ﬁnancial,
role of brand, and brand strength analyses. The ﬁnancial analysis forecasts current and future revenues attributed to the branded products, subtracting the costs
of doing business (e.g., operating costs, taxes) and intangibles such as patents and management strength, to assess the portion of earnings due to the brand. The
role of the brand constitutes a measure of how the brand inﬂuences customer demand at the point of purchase. Finally, brand strength provides a benchmark of
the brand's ability to secure ongoing customer demand (loyalty, repurchase, and retention) and sustain future earnings, which translates branded earnings into
net present value. This assessment provides a structured means to determine speciﬁc risks to the strength of the brands. We express this variable in logs to
reduce skewness.
Main explanatory variables
Community Community satisfaction is the weighted average of the following items where Yes (Y) is tabulated as 100% and No (N) is tabulated as 0: (1) the existence of local
community programs (Y/N), (2) the existence of a formal policy on local community involvement (Y/N), (3) the existence of management responsibility
for local community affairs (Y/N), (4) the existence of formal volunteer programs (Y/N), (5) the existence of programs for consultation with local communities
(Y/N) and (6) percentage of donations directed at local communities. The weights are sector-speciﬁc and are determined by SGP's analysts. They take into
consideration the potential negative effect of a ﬁrm's operations in the different items of community's interests. Once normalized, the result is a continuous-
type variable between 0 and 100%. For those items that are not dichotomic variables, there are intermediate values: 20% is marginal (ﬁrst quartile), 40% is below
the mean; 50% is in the mean; 60% is above the mean; and 80% is clearly signiﬁcant (last quartile).
Customers Customers is the weighted average of the following items where Yes (Y) is tabulated as 100% and No (N) is tabulated as 0: (1) the existence of a formal policy
statement noting customer issues (Y/N), (2) the existence of a formal policy with regard to product quality (Y/N), (3) whether a formal policy pertainst o
marketing/advertising practices (Y/N), (4) the existence of a formal policy on product safety (Y/N), (5) whether there is board responsibility for customer
satisfaction (Y/N), (6) the existence of facilities with quality certiﬁcation (Y/N) and (7) the existence of marketing practices designed to satisfy customers (Y/N).
The weights are sector-speciﬁc and are determined by SGP's analysts. They take into consideration the potential negative effect of a ﬁrm's operations in the
different items of customers' interests. Once normalized, the result is a continuous-type variable between 0 and 100%.
Corporate
governance
Corporate governance is the weighted average of the following items, where Yes (Y) is tabulated as 100% and No (N) is tabulated as 0: (1) number of board
committees, (2) managerial stock ownership, (3) if the company has corporate governance principles (Y/N), (4) directors' terms of ofﬁce, (5) the existence of a
board performance evaluation (Y/N), (6) number of NEDs in the Board, (7) number of independent NEDs in the Board, (8) the existence of a separate position
for chairman of board and CEO (Y/N), (9) the existence of a “one share, one vote” principle (Y/N) and (10) absence of anti-takeover devices (Y/N). The weights
are sector-speciﬁc and are determined by SGP's analysts. They take into consideration the potential negative effect of a ﬁrm's operations in the different items of
corporate governance's interests. Once normalized, the result is a continuous-type variable between 0 and 100%. For those items that are not dichotomic variables,
there are intermediate values: 20% is marginal (ﬁrst quartile), 40% is below the mean, 50% is in the mean, 60% is above the mean and 80% is clearly signiﬁcant (last
quartile).
Employees Employees satisfaction is the weighted average of the following items, where Yes (Y) is tabulated as 100% and No (N) is tabulated as 0: (1) the existence of
policies/principles regarding employees (Y/N), (2) the existence of a formal policy statement on health and safety (Y/N), (3) the existence of a formal policy on
diversity/employment equity (Y/N), (4) the existence of a formal policy on freedom of association (Y/N), (5) the existence of a formal policy statement on child/
forced labor (Y/N), (6) the existence of a formal policy statement on working hours (Y/N), (7) the existence of a formal policy statement on wages (Y/N), (8) the
existence of board responsibility for human resources issues (Y/N), (9) the existence of speciﬁc health and safety targets (Y/N), (10) the existence of diversity/
equal opportunity programs (Y/N), (11) the existence of work/life programs (Y/N), (12) the existence of training programs (Y/N), (13) the existence of
participative management programs(Y/N), (14)the existenceof cashproﬁt-sharing programs(Y/N), and(15) theexistence ofa supervisory board (NEDs)(Y/N).
The weights are sector-speciﬁc and are determined by SGP's analysts. They take into consideration the potential negative effect of a ﬁrm's operations in the
different items of employees' interests. Once normalized, the result is a continuous-type variable between 0 and 100%.
Suppliers Suppliers' satisfaction is the weighted average of the following items, where Yes (Y) is tabulated as 100% and No (N) is tabulated as 0: (1) the existence of a code
of conduct for contractors (Y/N), (2) the existence of board responsibility for contractors' human rights (Y/N), (3) the existence of a contractors' awareness
programs (Y/N), (4) whether contractors with social certiﬁcation are used (Y/N), (5) the existence of health and safety programs among contractors (Y/N),
(6) whether there is freedom of association among contractors (Y/N), (7) the existence of child/forced labor among contractors (Y/N), (8) whether there is
discrimination among contractors (Y/N) and (9) employment conditions among contractors. The weights are sector-speciﬁc and are determined by SGP's
analysts. They take into consideration the potential negative effect of a ﬁrm's operations in the different items of suppliers' interests. Once normalized, the result
is a continuous-type variable between 0 and 100%. For those items that are not dichotomic variables, there are intermediate values: 20% is marginal (ﬁrst
quartile), 40% is below the mean, 50% is in the mean, 60% is above the mean and 80% is clearly signiﬁcant (last quartile).
CSR It is the weighted average of the scores for community, customer, corporate governance, employees, and suppliers. These weights are the result of adding the
different weights that are included in the policy and managerial procedures section of each stakeholder. The result is a continuous-type variable between 0 and
100%.
Control variables
Size Total sales on a log scale
ROA Earnings before interest and taxes to total assets
Leverage The debt-to-equity ratio
R&D The ratio of R&D investments to total sales
5 We conducted internal consistency and dimensionality tests to assess the reliabil-
ity of these proxies. For internal consistency, the reliability coefﬁcients (Cronbach's al-
phas) for the ﬁve measures of stakeholders are greater than 0.90, indicating that the
proxies are internally consistent with the underlying factor of the different stake-
holders' satisfaction. In particular, reliability coefﬁcients are 0.947 for the community,
0.942 for customers, 0.975 for corporate governance, 0.973 for employees and 0.918 for
suppliers. For dimensionality, we also included the set of indicators of one factor as in-
dicators in another factor; their individual correlations in almost all cases are below
0.5, indicating the unidimensionality in the loadings.
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5consideration the potential negative effect of a ﬁrm's operations in
the different items of each stakeholder. The weight is assigned in pro-
portion to this potential. Once normalized, the result is a continuous-
type variable between 0 and 100%.
6 The SGP database also provides
an overall rating on CSR by weighting the score of the different stake-
holders (see Appendix A for an example of how these scores are com-
puted). The resulting score is a proxy for the ﬁrm's overall dedication
to the implementation of socially responsible policies.
We include return-on-assets (ROA) and research and develop-
ment (R&D) as controls (Chu & Keh, 2006; McWilliams & Siegel,
2000)
7; risk as it relates to a ﬁrm's leverage (Rego, Billett, &
Morgan, 2009); and Size, which is a proxy for a ﬁrm's visibility, as
BE value is connected to a ﬁrm's visibility (Godfrey et al., 2009). See
Table 1 for deﬁnitions.
3.2. Methodology
We test our Hypotheses by relying on a speciﬁcation that explains
global BE value in terms of the different dimensions of a ﬁrm's CSR
and a set of control variables. In particular, we consider the following
speciﬁcation, which also includes interactive terms, to test Hypothe-
sis H4:
Brand Equityit ¼ β þ α0Brand Equityit 1 þ α1Communityit
þα2Customeritþα3Corporate Governanceeit
þα4Employeesit þ α5Suppliersit þ α6Community
 Customerit þ α7Community   Corporate Governanceit
þα8Community   Employeesit þ α9Community
 Suppliersit þ α10Sizeit þ α11ROAit þ α12Leverageit
þα13R&Dit þ Controls Sector;Year;Country ðÞ þ ηi þ εit
ð1Þ
where i and t index ﬁrm and year, respectively; controls (Sector, Year,
Country) are a set of dummy variables that capture temporal, sector,
and country effects; ηi is the possible ﬁrm-speciﬁc component of the
error term; and εit is the error term.
8
This speciﬁcation has three caveats. First, a correlation might exist
between the unobservable ﬁrm-speciﬁc error term ηi and some of the
explanatory variables (ﬁxed-effect problem). For example, the char-
acteristics of the manager (which are time invariant) may inﬂuence
the CSR policy and the global brand value. In this case, the relation-
ship between CSR policies and global BE would be spurious and
based on their mutual connection with managerial characteristics
(ηi). We examine the relevance of this ﬁxed effect in our speciﬁcation
using the Hausman test. The result of this test is that we can estimate
speciﬁcation (1) using random-effect estimations, which are more
efﬁcient than ﬁxed-effect estimations.
9
Second, the previous estimation may have reverse causality prob-
lems: BE value may help ﬁrms obtain resources from ﬁnancial mar-
kets that can be devoted to social issues (i.e., slack theory; see
McGuire, Sundgren, & Schneeweis, 1988; Waddock & Graves, 1997).
We address this endogeneity concern related to reverse causality by
using instruments of the potential endogenous variables (the overall
CSR score, community, customer, corporate governance, employees,
and suppliers). To construct such instruments, we run an estimation
of each potential endogenous variable in terms of the following ex-
planatory variables: the corresponding dependent variable lagged
by one and two periods, respectively
10; Size; ROA; Leverage; and
R&D intensity as deﬁned in Table 1. After running such estimations,
we compute the predicted value of each estimation.
11 Such predicted
variables are taken as instruments of the endogenous variables. Note
that there are two conditions that a good instrument has to satisfy.
First, an instrument should show a high correlation with the instru-
mented variable, and second, an instrument should show null corre-
lation with the error term in the speciﬁcation explaining BE. The
predicted values computed using the lagged values of the endoge-
nous variables (CSR and different stakeholders' satisfaction variables)
and control variables are, by design, highly correlated with the instru-
mented variables, given the inertia of a ﬁrm's CSR policy.
12 Moreover,
we do not expect such instruments to be correlated with the error
term in the speciﬁcation of BE. Note that once we compute the pre-
dicted value of each endogenous variable, we are imposing that the
error term of the corresponding speciﬁcation is equal to 0. Thus, we
are eliminating the part of the endogenous (CSR and different stake-
holders' satisfaction) variables that is not explained by the lagged de-
pendent variables up to 2 periods or the control variables. This
unexplained part is, by design, very likely to be connected to the
error term in the speciﬁcation (1) of BE. The elimination of this
error component also allows for the elimination of the correlation be-
tween the error term in speciﬁcation (1) of the BE variable and the in-
struments (predicted variables). Then, both conditions of an
instrument are satisﬁed.
13
Third, we estimate a partial adjustment model (Hanssens, Parsons,
& Schultz, 2001) in which we include the dependent variable lagged
by one period. The inclusion of this variable enables us to tackle ad-
justment costs associated with changes in a ﬁrm's brand value. The
implicit assumption is that ﬁrms approach an optimal level of BE
with some adjustment costs. In addition, with this approach, we can
compute both long-term and short-term effects.
14 One criticism of
this model is that the error terms may be correlated over time. We
test for this possibility and do ﬁnd that a ﬁrst-order correlation exists
in the error term. Thus, we conduct a general least squares (GLS)
random-effect estimation, specifying both AR(1) autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity in the error term. In the estimations, we clus-
ter the error term at ﬁrm level.
6 For example, the items that are more related to practical issues involving the com-
munity are weighted more heavily for public services: transportation, radio, television,
electric, gas, and sanitation (SIC=4) than for manufacturing: tobacco and, beverages
(SIC=2).
7 Investment in R&D improves a ﬁrm's technology capability that, on the one hand,
can accommodate better products to consumer preferences and, on the other hand,
improve productivity that, in turn, increases ﬁnancial performance. Both features lead
to an increase in a ﬁrm's BE.
8 We assume the same carryover effects for all stakeholders. Our assumption of no
differential lags on the impact of the different stakeholders' satisfaction on BE relies
on our theoretical framework in which we posit that all stakeholders have an impact
on BE without differentiating temporal lags among them. This assumption is widely
used in the literature connecting social performance with ﬁnancial performance (see
the meta-analyses of Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003).
9 We also rely on random-effect estimations because of the persistence in the vari-
ables related to CSR policies (low intertemporal variability). This persistence makes
ﬁxed-effect estimations, which are based on differences over time, particularly inefﬁ-
cient. Additionally, there is high inertia in the dependent variable — BE, which is cap-
tured by the high value of the α0 parameter that measures adjustment costs.
10 We have included up to 2 lagged-period variables in the estimations used for con-
structing the instruments because of the presence of the dependent variable (BE)
lagged by one period as explanatory in speciﬁcation (1).
11 These predicted values are the result of multiplying the different estimated coefﬁ-
cients by the explanatory variables taken in their mean value of the distribution.
12 The coefﬁcients of the lagged dependent variables in all speciﬁcations are larger
than 0.6 with pb.01. The variable that shows the greatest persistence is the communi-
ty, with a coefﬁcient of 0.647. These ﬁgures are indicative of the signiﬁcant correlation
between the instruments and the instrumented (CSR) variables.
13 Additionally, and in accordance with the previous two conditions, we have also
conducted two tests, which are reported in Table 3, to measure the relevance of the in-
struments and their exogeneity. First, we show an F-test developed by Stock and Yogo
(2005) that measures the explanatory power of the instruments of the endogenous
variable. The second is the Hansen test to contrast the overidentiﬁcation restriction,
that is, whether instruments are orthogonal to the error term (Bascle, 2008). All instru-
ments pass the previous tests as shown in Table 3.
14 The partial adjustment model proposed assumes that all dimensions of CSR are
short- and long-term determinants of BE. This assumption conforms to our theoretical
framework in which our theoretical contentions apply to short- and long-term
scenarios.
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6Hypothesis H1 is conﬁrmed when the coefﬁcient of CSR in
explaining BE is signiﬁcantly positive. We test Hypothesis H2 if
α1>0, α2>0, α3>0, α4>0, and α5>0 according to speciﬁcation
(1).
15 Hypothesis H3 is tested if α1, α2>Max(α3, α4, α5). Finally, we
test Hypothesis H4 with the coefﬁcients α6, α7, α7 and α9 of the
terms that result when we cross the variable community with the
variables that capture CSR policy with respect to the remaining stake-
holders (customer, corporate governance, employees, and suppliers).
Hypothesis H4 is conﬁrmed when α6, α7, α7 and α9 are signiﬁcantly
positive and there is a signiﬁcant improvement in the R
2 value from
the model without interactions.
3.3. Results
3.3.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows the means, standard deviations, minimum and
maximum values, and the correlations of the variables used in the
speciﬁcation (1). The correlation matrix shows that BE is positively
correlated with all stakeholders and mainly with community (25%)
and customers (20%). This evidence is in line with Hypotheses H1,
H2, and H3. However, we cannot extract deﬁnitive conclusions from
this preliminary analysis given that such a correlation analysis does
not control for the possibility of spurious connections related to variables
such as Size. In addition, among the control variables, large ﬁrms, more
proﬁtable ﬁrms,andﬁrmsthatinvestinR&Dareallpositivelycorrelated
with BE. Almost all correlations between the explanatory variables are
below 0.70,
16 and the variance inﬂation factors are below 10 except
for the term community×customer (10.27), indicating that multicoli-
nearity is not a critical problem.
17
3.3.2. Main effects of CSR
Table 3 shows the results of the model speciﬁcation (1). Column 1
includestheaggregatescoreofCSRasanexplanatoryvariable;incolumn
2,wedisaggregatethisvariableinitsdifferentdimensions(community,
customer, corporate governance, employees, and suppliers). In both
cases, we use the instrumental variables, as we explained in the
Methodology section (3.2).
We ﬁnd that a ﬁrm's CSR has a positive impact on BE (α0=0.657,
pb0.01). For the different dimensions of a ﬁrm's CSR (see column 2),
we ﬁnd that community (α1=0.725, pb0.01), customer (α2=0.544,
pb0.01), corporate governance (α3=0.510, pb0.01), employees
(α4=0.491, pb0.01), and suppliers (α5=0.511, pb0.01) have a posi-
tive effect on a ﬁrm's BE value. The above results support Hypotheses
H1 and H2.
Community and customer CSR have indeed the largest effects on
BE (column 2 of Table 3). However, the t-tests show no signiﬁcant
differences between any of the coefﬁcients compared (all p-











16 Four correlations involving interaction terms are slightly above the threshold of
0.70; to test whether this feature generates serious multicolinearity problems, we have
re-estimated the complete speciﬁcation using a dummy D_community instead of the
continuous variable community. The previous dummy is equal to 1 (0) when commu-
nity is above (below) the mean value for the corresponding sector and year. The inter-
action terms with the dummy show correlations below 0.70; hence, multicolinearity is
less problematic. Remarkably, the results using such alternative interaction terms are
similar to those shown in Table 3.
17 Consistent with the lack of multicolinearity problems, we have conducted the Belsley
(1991) test, which establishes that a condition number above 30 is a signal of multicoli-
nearity problems.Inourcase, thecondition number forthe full speciﬁcation modelofcol-
umn 3 in Table 3 (instruction cndnmb3 in STATA) is 23.7. Additionally, we conducted
different estimations that include single interaction terms that cross Community times
the different stakeholders. We compared the results with those of the complete speciﬁca-
tion of column 3 inTable 3, whichincludesall of the interaction terms (available upon re-
quest). The coefﬁcients found in the different speciﬁcations are quite stable, which is
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7values>.10).
18 Hence, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant empirical support for
Hypothesis H3.
Among the control variables, large ﬁrms that are more visible
(α10=0.060 with pb0.01) or more proﬁtable (α11=0.032 with
pb0.10), and ﬁrms that invest in R&D (α13=0.095 with pb0.05),
which creates intangible assets, have higher BE values.
Finally,theinclusionofthelaggedtermofBEinourmodelallowsfor
the assessment of the long-term effects of CSR activities. The signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient of Brand Equityit−1 in column 2 of Table 3 (α0=0.910,
pb0.01) indicates that all stakeholders are signiﬁcant determinants of
long-term BE value. In particular, (
α1
1−α0












with pb0:01) for employees; and (
α5
1−α0
¼ 5:678 with pb0:01) for
suppliers.
3.3.3. Interaction effects with CSR community
Column 3 of Table 3 shows the tests of Hypothesis H4 and includes
four alternative interaction terms (community×customers, commu-
nity×corporate governance, community×employees, and communi-
ty×suppliers). These variables test the possible moderating effect of
community and the different stakeholders on BE.
In accordance with column 2, all stakeholders have positive im-
pacts on a ﬁrm's BE. Regarding the interactive terms, we have found
that community, interacting with the remaining stakeholders' vari-
ables, enhances the positive impact of these latter variables on BE.
In particular, community positively moderates the effect of customer
on BE (α6=0.004 with pb0.01). Hence, although we do not ﬁnd larg-
er effects of CSR toward community and toward customers than we
do with other stakeholders, we do ﬁnd that the combination of CSR
toward community and customers generates larger effects on BE
than other stakeholders do individually.
19 By the same token, com-
munity plays a positive moderating role in the connection of share-
holder value (corporate governance) to BE value (α7=0.002 with
pb0.05). These results also hold for employees (α8=0.0015 with
pb0.05) and suppliers (α9=0.0019 with pb0.10). Remarkably, the
moderating effect of community is larger when combined with CSR
toward customers than when combined with other stakeholders.
20
This result conﬁrms our statement that the effects of credible CSR poli-
cies (i.e., CSR toward community) will have particularly large effects
when combined with visible CSR policies such as those of CSR toward
customers.
Finally, the coefﬁcient of the dependent variable lagged by one
period is still signiﬁcant at pb0.01, and thus, we can state that the
previous moderating results also hold for the long-term analysis. All
of these results conﬁrm Hypothesis H4.
Concerning the model ﬁt, the R
2 value is very high (98.97%), and
this result is an improvement on the model of column 2
(ΔR
2=3.04, p=0.034), which indicates that community plays a sig-
niﬁcant moderating role in the model of column 3.
21 Remarkably,
once we extract the lagged dependent variable from the speciﬁcation,
the R
2 value decreases to 49.72%. Approximately one half of the ex-
planatory power is due to the lagged dependent variable. This result
is evidence that there is considerable inertia in BE, indicating that
CSR investment has long-lasting effects on BE value.
4. Discussion, implications, limitations and future research
4.1. Discussion of results
In this paper, we analyze the effect of different dimensions of a
ﬁrm's corporate social responsible (CSR) policy on the creation of
global brand equity (BE). Studying CSR for global brands is highly rele-
vant, as global brands are frequently blamed for not having strong CSR
records. Our study, using a longitudinal database of 57 global brands
invariousindustriesand10differentcountries,showsthestrongeffects
of CSR initiatives directed at different stakeholders on global BE. Below,
we discuss our most important results and reﬂect on the implications
for the management of global brands.
18 We are using the
α 1;2 fg −α 3;4;5 fg ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
σ2
ε α 1;2 fg ðÞ þσ2
ε α 3;4;5 fg ðÞ
p statistic to test signiﬁcant differences
between the coefﬁcients of community and customers (α1 and α2) and those of corpo-
rate governance, employees and suppliers (α3, α4 and α5).
19 In the speciﬁcation of column 3, we will also see that community×customers gen-
erates larger effects not only to other individual stakeholders but also to the combina-
tion of these latter stakeholders to community.
20 When we compare the coefﬁcient of community×customer to community×corp.
governance, the t-test of differences shows a p-value=0.025. The p-value is 0.020
for the comparison between community×customer and community×employees. Fi-
nally, the comparison between community×customer and community×suppliers
leads to a p-value=0.059.
21 Such a high R
2 value is similar to other studies that include the lagged dependent
variable as an explanatory factor. For example, Sriram, Balachander, and Kalwani
(2007) found an R
2 of 92% explaining BE by that variable lagged by one period and ad-
vertising innovation and sales promotion variables.
Table 3
Determinants of brand equity
a.































Size 0.061⁎⁎⁎ 0.060⁎⁎⁎ 0.058⁎⁎⁎
(0.021) (0.021) (0.024)
ROA 0.037⁎ 0.032⁎ 0.038
(0.027) (0.021) (0.028)
Leverage 0.089⁎ 0.076⁎ 0.065
(0.051) (0.050) (0.083)
R&D 0.140⁎⁎ 0.095⁎⁎ 0.153⁎
(0.056) (0.047) (0.091)
Intercept 0.499⁎⁎⁎ 0.458⁎⁎⁎ 0.419⁎⁎⁎
(0.162) (0.069) (0.125)
Observations 243 243 243
Hausman test 32.28 (0.386) 16.98 (0.596) 11.77 (1.000)
Weak identiﬁcation test 60.58 (0.000) 29.05 (0.000) 10.97 (0.052)
Hansen test
(overidentiﬁcation)
1.49 (0.999) 1.20 (1.000) 1.44 (0.999)
R
2 (%) 93.97% 95.93% 98.97%
a Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ⁎⁎⁎ pb0.01, ⁎⁎ pb0.05, ⁎ pb0.1. We use
the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak identiﬁcation test, where the null Hypothesis is that
instruments are weak (non-signiﬁcant correlation with the endogenous variable).
The Hansen overidentiﬁcation test has a null Hypothesis such that there is a null corre-
lation between the instrument and the error term. Reliable instruments have to reject
the null Hypothesis in the weak identiﬁcation test and accept it in the Hansen test.
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8First, we ﬁnd that CSR positively affects global BE. This result is an
important extension of the previous literature on CSR, as it is the ﬁrst
study to actually show this effect in an international setting. This re-
sult conﬁrms prior studies showing that CSR affects ﬁrm performance
(e.g., Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et
al., 2003). Moreover, we also show that CSR directed at stakeholders
generates a positive effect on both short-term and long-term BE
values.
Second, CSR toward community and toward customers does not
have a signiﬁcantly larger effect on a ﬁrm's global BE than the other
CSRefforts.However,thecombinationofbothCSRpolicies(towardcus-
tomers and toward community) does have a larger impact on BE than
CSR toward other stakeholders. These results do not conﬁrm that CSR
initiatives that are more visible or credible in the marketplace have a
greater effect on BE. Nevertheless, they do conﬁrm that joint CSR initia-
tives combining visibility (customers) and credibility (community)
have a stronger effect on a marketing metric such as global BE than
other combinations. This result conﬁrms claims made by Wood and
Jones (1995) that there should be a match between the CSR initiative
and the outcome measure. The insigniﬁcance in the differences of our
ﬁndings on the direct effects for the different stakeholders can poten-
tiallybeattributedtotherelativelysmallnumberofﬁrmsinoursample.
Beyond that, we may argue that “internal” stakeholders such as em-
ployees and suppliers are as important as community and customers,
given that they provide the type of valuable, intangible resources that
are the basis of a ﬁrm's competitive advantage, which, in turn, enhance
a ﬁrm's BE. Another explanation might be that, as already noted, CSR
visibility can also have some negative effects, as it may cause a stronger
salienceoftheﬁrm'sself-beneﬁttingmotivesforCSR(Yoonetal.,2006).
These possible negative effects are why it is particularly important to
combinevisibleCSR(directedatcustomers)withcredibleCSR(directed
at community).
Third, the importance of CSR toward communities is emphasized
by the interaction effects that have been found with CSR toward com-
munity and CSR initiatives toward other stakeholders and particularly
toward customers. These results point to the indirect beneﬁcial effect
of CSR toward community. The satisfaction of community interests
gives credibility to a ﬁrm as an entity with an ethical stance to all
stakeholders (Godfrey et al., 2009). Gaining such a reputation has
its own direct value, particularly to global brands. In the event of
shock-generating controversies in parts of the organization, a gained
reputation in social issues may prevent the growth of a negative
image throughout the organization, which could seriously damage a
global brand image. The indirect effect of CSR toward community is
a reinforcing mechanism (positive moderator), in terms of its positive
impact on BE in satisfying all stakeholders' interests. Such a reinfor-
cing mechanism reﬂects the trust that arises from ﬁrms applying
credible CSR practices toward secondary stakeholders (Logsdon &
Wood, 2002). Furthermore, connections to distant stakeholders are
more informative than connections to closer stakeholders in asses-
sing a ﬁrm's credibility on its ethical stance (Granovetter, 1983).
Therefore, a global brand that has gained trust through its relation-
ship with community will be capable of lending conﬁdence to all its
stakeholders regarding its long-term commitment, which in turn
will have a positive effect on its short-term and long-term BE values.
Finally, we argue that for the large and complex organizations that
are behind global brands, information asymmetries and the need for
monitoring are particularly important (Zajac & Westphal, 1994). In
this framework, the implementation of credible CSR policies such as
those targeted toward community will reduce opportunistic behaviors
thatemergein information asymmetrycontexts. Theresultisa creation
of brand value.
4.2. Managerial implications
Our ﬁndings provide several implications for managers.
First, we demonstrate that global brand managers should indeed
incorporate CSR as a primary component of their brand equity-
enhancing strategy, as Polonsky and Jevons (2009) suggest. Second,
managers who wish to send visible and credible signals of commit-
ment to enhance their ﬁrms' global BE value should pay particular at-
tention to the less salient stakeholders. That is, global brand
management should give substantial weight to satisfying local com-
munity interests. To illustrate the importance of focusing on CSR for
global brands and speciﬁcally the strong effects of CSR toward com-
munity, we have performed an analysis of the economic conse-
quences of improving different CSR components. In economic terms,
when we do not consider interaction effects, the marginal impact of
CSR toward customer on BE is given by the coefﬁcient (α2=0.518,
pb0.01). However, when we consider interaction effects with com-
munity, once we ﬁx CSR toward community at its mean value of the
distribution (58.16), the marginal effect of CSR toward customers
on BE is given by the coefﬁcient (α2+α6×Mean(Community)=
0.518+0.004×58.16=0.751, pb0.01). These coefﬁcients indicate
that an increase in one standard deviation in customer satisfaction
(0.227) leads to an increase in $1752.24 million in BE,
22 or an
11.76% increase from the mean value of BE ($14,900 million), without
considering interaction effects. This ﬁgure increases to 17.04%
($2538.96 million) when we include the moderation of community,
which means that the moderating effect of community is translated
to a relative increase of 44.90% ($786.72 million) in BE value. When
we apply the same type of analysis to corporate governance, the num-
bers are a 9.57% increase when we do not consider interaction effects
and a 12.20% increase ($1817.8 million) when we consider interac-
tion effects and ﬁx community at its mean value. For employees, the
increase is 8.09% when we do not consider interaction effects and
9.78% ($1457.22 million) when we consider interaction effects. Final-
ly, for suppliers, the ﬁgures are 9.84% and 12.46% ($1856.54 million),
respectively. Thus, the variations in the different CSR dimensions lead
to considerable economic variations in BE and particularly when com-
munity moderates CSR toward customers.
Therefore, global brands that aim to improve their BE with CSR
should develop CSR initiatives toward communities that reinforce
CSR initiatives with other stakeholders. CSR initiatives toward the
local community can be especially valuable, as they may integrate
with existing global brand strategies. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms can pursue a
dual strategy of creating a global brand and developing symbols at a
local level (Alden et al., 2006) through the satisfaction of local com-
munity interests. This type of strategy is followed by ﬁrms such as
Coca-Cola and Heineken, which are perceived simultaneously as global
brandsand asﬁrms withstrongrootsindifferent national communities
(Alden et al., 2006).
Third, the relevance of CSR for global brands also has implications
for their merger and acquisition strategies. Global brands that expand
internationally and wish to create certain standards of CSR policies
abroad should acquire ﬁrms with strong community roots. In short,
global brand managers need to be aware that local satisfaction is at
the root of improving global BE value. Such a strategy would eliminate
fears of corporate expropriation by entrant ﬁrms in less developed
countries.
Lastly, one ﬁnal implication is that managers should not focus on
single-stakeholder CSR policies, particularly managers of global
brands. These multinational enterprises (MNEs) should be particular-
ly conscious of maintaining a balance among different stakeholders in
the generation of BE. Managers of global brands should not put exces-
sive weight on market-oriented stakeholder-like customers. Brands
are complex social phenomena, and thus, managers who wish to sus-
tain CSR policies that create global BE value should maintain a balance
22 This value is calculated by 0.223×0.518×14,900=$1721.16 million. Note that the
dependent variable BE is deﬁned on a log scale and that the mean value of BE is
$14,900 million.
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9among the different stakeholders rather than focus on a single stake-
holder (Maio, 2003). That is, all components of CSR have a positive
impact on global brands.
4.3. Limitations and future research avenues
One of the limitations of our study is that the MNEs analyzed are
based in developed countries, which may question the generalizability
of the results. Moreover, the use of the Interbrand measure, which fo-
cuses on strong (global) brands, strengthens this problem. However,
the measurement approach of Interbrand, which is not based on cus-
tomer surveys but on proprietary information,may open thepossibility
of extracting information from subsidiaries of MNEs operating in less
developed countries. Nevertheless, we may speculate that the effect of
establishing socially responsible policies in developing countries is a
powerful signal of MNE commitment to stakeholders, and we may ex-
pectthattheeffectonBEshouldbeeven clearerin developedcountries.
Further research should be extended to developing countries and
emerging economies, e.g., Turkey, Brazil, and China (Burgess &
Steenkamp, 2005). A second limitation is the dichotomous items used
in the deﬁnition of the proxies on social responsibility to the different
stakeholders. We have minimized this problem by averaging a broad
set of items to obtain a continuous-type variable.
Our ﬁndings reveal that satisfying community interests is highly
relevant to creating and maintaining global brand value. A natural ex-
tension of our model would be to incorporate virtual communities
into the analysis to determine whether the reinforcing effects linked
to real communities also hold for these types of communities. Another
avenue would be to include other stakeholders in the analysis. For
example, research could assess whether the crucial role of CSR toward
one secondary stakeholder (community) differs from that toward
other secondary stakeholders, such as the environment. The absence
of environment-related CSR in our measurement of CSR is a limitation.
Hills and Welford (2005) discuss the relevance of the environmental
issue for Coca-Cola, suggesting the potential relevance of this CSR
issueinaglobalbrandingcontext.Thisrelevanceisconﬁrmedindirectly
in ouranalysis,given thatsomeitems in communityscore referto envi-
ronmental issues. Finally, a contingency analysis of the economic cycle
would be of interest. Following existing research on the consequences
of the economic cycle (e.g., Lamey, Deleersnyder, Dekimpe, &
Steenkamp, 2007), it is of crucial importance to understand whether
and which CSR policies become more or less relevant during economic
recessions. Moreover, it would also be relevant to investigate whether
the global BE of brands that have invested in CSR is less affected by, or
mayevenbeneﬁt from,strongmarket crises suchasthe recentﬁnancial
crisis. Initial case-based evidence in the Dutch banking market suggests
that the cooperative Rabobank, which has clear local community CSR
initiatives, has been less affected by the global crisis (Verhoef,
Wesselius, Bügel, & Wiesel, 2010). Future research could investigate
this issue empirically.
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Stakeholder (j) Items (i) Score (%) Weight Weighted score (%) Weight Weighted score (%)





Community 1 Local communities' programs 100 0.014 1.379 0.154 15.385
2 Formal policy on local community involvement 100 0.021 2.069 0.231 23.077
3 Management responsibility for local community affairs 100 0.014 1.379 0.154 15.385
4 Formal volunteer programs 0 0.014 0.000 0.154 0.000
5 Programs for consultation with local communities 0 0.014 0.000 0.154 0.000
6 Percentage of donations directed at local communities 20 0.014 0.276 0.154 3.077
Community score 56.2
Customer 1 A formal policy statement noting customer issues 100 0.010 1.034 0.038 3.797
2 Formal policy on product quality 100 0.052 5.172 0.190 18.987
3 Formal policy on marketing/advertising practices 100 0.052 5.172 0.190 18.987
4 Formal policy on product safety 100 0.028 2.759 0.101 10.127
5 Board responsibility for customer satisfaction 100 0.028 2.759 0.101 10.127
6 Facilities with quality certiﬁcation 0 0.052 0.000 0.190 0.000
7 Marketing practices to satisfy customers 0 0.052 0.000 0.190 0.000
Customers score 62.03
Corporate governance 1 Number of board committees 60 0.010 0.621 0.058 3.462
2 Managerial stock ownership (%) 20 0.007 0.138 0.038 0.769
3 The company has corporate governance principles 100 0.062 6.207 0.346 34.615
4 Directors' terms of ofﬁce 20 0.007 0.138 0.038 0.769
5 Board performance evaluation 0 0.007 0.000 0.038 0.000
6 Number of NEDs in the Board 100 0.017 1.724 0.096 9.615
7 Number of independent NEDs in the Board 40 0.017 0.690 0.096 3.846
8 Separate position for chairman of board and CEO 100 0.017 1.724 0.096 9.615
9 “One share, one vote” principle 100 0.017 1.724 0.096 9.615
10 Absence of anti-takeover devices 0 0.017 0.000 0.096 0.000
Corporate governance score 72.31
Employees 1 Policies/principles regarding employees 100 0.010 1.034 0.042 4.167
2 Formal policy statement on health and safety 100 0.024 2.414 0.097 9.722
3 Formal policy on diversity/employment equity 100 0.024 2.414 0.097 9.722
4 Formal policy on freedom of association 100 0.024 2.414 0.097 9.722
5 Formal policy statement on child/forced labor 100 0.010 1.034 0.042 4.167
6 Formal policy statement on working hours 100 0.024 2.414 0097 9.722
7 Formal policy statement on wages 100 0.010 1.034 0.042 4.167
Appendix A. Corporate sustainability rating
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10Sustainalytics provides a wide range of research and consultancy
services to the largest asset managers, insurance companies, pension
funds, banks, and social investment institutions in the world. One of
these services is the Sustainalytics Global Proﬁle (SGP). SGP provides
a rating that enables users to integrate ﬁrms' detailed proﬁles in a
unique rating that contains 199 information items. These information
items are translated into a more comprehensive format — a rating —
by implementing Likert-type scales and then, they are grouped into
eight research sections. The ﬁrst provides a description of ethical/
unethical corporate activities such as political donations, corruption
and bribery, and the existence of business ethics programs addressing
these issues. The last section measures the degree of involvement in
controversial business activities such as those involving gambling, al-
cohol, pornography, animal testing, and tobacco. The realization of
one of these controversial activities is motive of exclusion of the
SGP sustainability index. The remaining six sections cover different is-
sues of the six stakeholders analyzed (community; customers; em-
ployees; corporate governance; suppliers and environment). In
particular, for each stakeholder, the database addresses the level of
a ﬁrm's involvement in four different areas: the level of a ﬁrm's trans-
parency/disclosure, the existence of corporate policies and principles
for the stakeholder, the importance of management procedures, and
the level of controversies in the relationship with this stakeholder.
In each of these areas, there are different information items that
give a score using a Likert-type scale. Also, each information item
has a weight according to a methodology developed by the SGP. The
ﬁnal score provided by the SGP is the sum of each of the scores of
all the items averaged by its corresponding weight. Also, the database
gives scores for each stakeholder. These scores are computed through
the weighted average of the corresponding information items to a
given stakeholder normalized by the sum of the weights of the
items for the corresponding stakeholder. For clariﬁcation purposes,
below, we describe in detail the information items that we consider
in the paper for a speciﬁc real company (Nestle). In particular, we
focus on those items related to policies, principles, and managerial pro-
cedures of the ﬁve stakeholders that are considered in the study (com-
munity, customers, corporate governance, employees, and suppliers).
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